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We present a framework for allocating a global carbon reduction
target among nations, in which the concept of ‘‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’’ refers to the emissions of individ-
uals instead of nations. We use the income distribution of a country
to estimate how its fossil fuel CO2 emissions are distributed among
its citizens, from which we build up a global CO2 distribution. We
then propose a simple rule to derive a universal cap on global
individual emissions and find corresponding limits on national
aggregate emissions from this cap. All of the world’s high CO2-
emitting individuals are treated the same, regardless of where they
live. Any future global emission goal (target and time frame) can
be converted into national reduction targets, which are deter-
mined by ‘‘Business as Usual’’ projections of national carbon
emissions and in-country income distributions. For example, re-
ducing projected global emissions in 2030 by 13 GtCO2 would
require the engagement of 1.13 billion high emitters, roughly
equally distributed in 4 regions: the U.S., the OECD minus the U.S.,
China, and the non-OECD minus China. We also modify our meth-
odology to place a floor on emissions of the world’s lowest CO2
emitters and demonstrate that climate mitigation and alleviation
of extreme poverty are largely decoupled.
climate change  climate equity  climate policy  individual emissions 
inequality
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) created a 2-tier world. It called upon the
developed (‘‘Annex I’’) countries to ‘‘take the lead’’ in reducing
carbon emissions, and, under the principle of ‘‘common but
differentiated responsibilities,’’ established no time frame for
developing countries to follow. However, a consensus is now
emerging in favor of low stabilization targets. These targets
cannot be achieved without the participation of developing
countries, which today emit about half of global CO2 emissions
and whose future emissions increase faster than the emissions of
industrialized countries under ‘‘business as usual’’ scenarios (1).
On what terms should developing countries participate? There
are many proposals, each buttressed by some appeal to ‘‘fair-
ness.’’ Per capita allocation is widely acknowledged to represent
the only equitable goal in the long term, but intermediate steps
are required in the short-to-medium term. Uniform percentage
reductions in emissions across all countries are rightly rejected
by all parties, on the grounds that industrialized countries must
create headroom for developing countries. Here, we offer a
different approach: An allocation of national targets for fossil-
fuel CO2 emissions derived from a fairness principle based on the
‘‘common but differentiated responsibilities’’ of individuals,
rather than nations. Our proposal moves beyond per capita
considerations to identify the world’s high-emitting individuals,
who are present in all countries.
Our approach is designed to blend parsimony, fairness, and
pragmatism—treat equally those with the same emissions, wher-
ever they live, and use only national income distributions and
economy-wide carbon intensities. National responsibilities are
derived by summing the excess emissions of all ‘‘high emitter’’
individuals in a country—‘‘high emitters’’ are those whose
emissions exceed a universal individual emission cap. The
scheme does not specify how any nationmeets its responsibilities.
Our approach is restricted to future fossil-fuel CO2 emis-
sions and focuses on the next 2 decades. We do not include
biospheric CO2, other greenhouse gases, and aerosols, because
they are not strongly correlated with personal expenditures
and national carbon intensities. By imputing national emis-
sions to individuals, we neglect embedded carbon in exports
and imports, a component that is relevant for countries with
large shares of trade in their economy. We also do not tackle
historical responsibility. These are all important topics, and a
complete scheme suitable for use in negotiations would need
to take them into account.
Baer et al. (2) uses a similar approach, but relies on high
incomes rather than high emissions and on a fixed income cap
at $7500 (PPP adjusted). In contrast, our scheme is based on
individual emissions rather than income to reward improve-
ments in national carbon intensity. Several others explore allo-
cation regimes based on convergence of national average per
capita emissions in the long-term, typically beyond 2050 (3–5),
whereas our proposal specifies a transient path that can lead
ultimately to long-term convergence.
Individual Emission Distributions. We begin by obtaining a picture
of how 26 GtCO2 of global emissions in 2003 were distributed
across the world’s 6.2 billion people. We first construct national
income distributions fromWorld Bank data (6).We then convert
these income distributions into individual CO2 emission distri-
butions, assuming unitary elasticity* and anchoring means using
country level emissions data. We use present and projected
emissions data from the Energy Information Agency (EIA) (7),
a freely available database with geographically disaggregated
emissions projections to 2030.
Fig. 1 shows how our method works for 2 representative
countries, Australia and France. The upper and lower panels
report the probability distributions for income and emissions,
respectively. Despite having similar incomes, the emission dis-
tribution in Australia is shifted to the right of that of France,
because Australia has a higher national carbon intensity. The
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plot shows that Australia hosts more individuals for every level
of annual emissions above 10 tCO2.
We apply this carbon intensity rescaling procedure to each
nation, and we obtain a picture of how individual emissions are
distributed globally by summing them up. The global cumulative
distribution for 2003 is shown in Fig. 2 Inset.† To develop our
approach, we also need the corresponding national and global CO2
emission distributions for future dates under BAU. For simplicity,
we assume that income inequality at the country level does not
change over time.We scale the distributions of individual emissions
to the projections of regional CO2 emissions and population, out to
2030, from EIA (7) and UN (8), respectively. The resulting BAU
distribution of the world’s 43 GtCO2 emissions in 2030 across 8.1
billion people is also shown in Fig. 2.
Sharing Emission Reductions to Achieve a Global Target. Once the
world agrees to a global CO2 emission reduction target, based on
a stabilization target, a framework is needed to arrive at national
emission allocations. Our approach provides a consistent rule for
determining these allocations. A universal cap is imposed on the
global individual emission distribution, such that eliminating all
emissions above that cap achieves the target (Fig. 2). The cartoon
in Fig. 3 introduces this scheme. The consequences of this cap are
country-level emission targets that reflect the number of ‘‘high
emitter’’ individuals in that country and their aggregate emis-
sions. The universal emission cap achieves equity and fairness in
the climate change context in the sense that: (i) countries with
a larger proportion of high emitters do more, and (ii) countries
with similar emission profiles have similar commitments.
Fig. 2 shows how this method works for a specific example: A
global fossil-fuel-CO2 emission target of 30 GtCO2 in 2030. This
case requires a 30% global cut in emissions with respect to BAU
for that year and essentially the same global emissions as in 2008.
The 2030 individual emission cap is 10.8 tCO2, and 1.13 billion
people (less than 15% of the 2030 global population) will be
above the cap.‡ The shaded area in Fig. 2 shows the total
emission reductions, 13 GtCO2. Fig. 2 also shows the individual
emission cap for global fossil-fuel-CO2 emission targets of 20, 25,
and 35 GtCO2 in 2030.§
Assuming a 30 GtCO2 target for 2030, Fig. 4 disaggregates Fig.
2 into the component emission distributions for 4 regions: U.S.,
OECDminus U.S., China, and the non-OECDminus China.¶ At
the global cap of 30 GtCO2, the 4 curves are close together,
reflecting the roughly 250 million people above the cap in each
of the 4 regions. In Fig. 5, we show the trajectories from 2003 to
2030, assuming that global emissions peak at 33 GtCO2 in 2020
and descend linearly to 30 GtCO2 in 2030. Noticeable departures
from BAU for China occur later than for the other 3 regions,
reflecting the relative paucity of high emitters in China at
present. Table 1 provides detailed results for the 30 GtCO2
target for 2030 for the 16 regions EIA uses in its projections. We
present a full set of corresponding Tables, for emission targets
of 20, 25, 30, and 35 GtCO2, and for 2020 and 2030, in the
supporting information (SI) Appendix.
The universal carbon emission threshold can be converted into
an income threshold for each country/region using the appro-
priate carbon intensity. In 2030, with BAU projections of 43
GtCO2 of fossil-fuel emissions and a global GDP of 154 trillion
†In the SI Appendix, we test a power-law relationship between CO2 emissions and income,
seeking a universal exponent  that best fits the historical data. As discussed in the SI, it is
estimated that   0.7. However, in Figs. 1–7 and Table 1 here, we show a linear
relationship   1.0, because this value of  is easy to analyze: Each country’s emissions
distribution is the same as its income distribution with a simple change of units. Also, as
seen in the SI Appendix, results for   0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0 are not very different.
‡‘‘One billion high emitters’’ in the title of our paper comes from this example. The actual
number depends on the date, the target, and the scenario used for the projection. As seen
in the supporting information, 0.60, 1.76, and 2.45 billions high emitters are involved in
2030 if the targets are35, 25, and20GtCO2, respectively, and if the reference scenario from
the EIA Annual International Outlook 2007 (7) is used. ‘‘One billion high emitters’’ is our
metaphor for a globally coordinated attack on climate change.
§A global target for a date as early as 2030 and restricted to fossil fuels cannot be
convincingly associated with any specific stabilization target, given the significance of
nonfossil fuel emissions, theuncertaintyabout land sinks, and themany followingdecades
during which the level of effort is unspecified. The 20, 25, and 30 GtCO2 targets for 2030
are intended to be examples of targets that require immediate globally coordinated
implementation, thereby making credible the eventual achievement of stringent stabili-
zation targets.
¶We group countries using OECD rather than Annex I in this paper because, typically,
projections of regional growth and emissions define regions using the OECD/non-OECD
distinction. TheOECD andAnnex I are not the same. Notably, Annex I includes Russia. CO2
emissions in 2003were 13.3 GtCO2 for theOECD but 18.4 GtCO2 for Annex I (UNFCCCGHG
data).
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Fig. 1. Income (Upper) and emissions (Lower) probability density functions
for Australia and France in 2003. The triangles on the horizontal axis indicate
the means of the distributions.
Fig. 2. The world’s population in 2030 (8.1 billion) ranked according to
decreasing annual emissions. The total area under the curve is the projected
BAU emissions in 2030 (43 GtCO2), and the blue region shows the 13 GtCO2
that needs to be removed to meet the 30 GtCO2 (‘‘30’’ in figure) target. The
individual emission cap is 10.8 tCO2, affecting 1.13 billion people. Also shown
are the individual emission caps for global targets of 20 GtCO2 (cap at 4.9
tCO2), 25 GtCO2 (cap at 7.3 tCO2), and 35 GtCO2 (cap at 16.8 tCO2). The Inset
contrasts the 2003 curve with the 2030 curve.
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dollars (PPP, in year 2000 dollars), each ton of fossil-fuel CO2
emissions is associated with $3600 of global GDP, and thus the
emission cap of 10.8 tCO2 corresponds to an average global PPP
income of about $39,000. The corresponding national income
thresholds vary significantly across countries, reflecting varia-
tions in national carbon intensity.
Addressing Poverty Alleviation and Carbon Emission Reductions Si-
multaneously. The approach can be modified to place a floor on
individual emissions. For example, a floor of 1 tCO2/yr per
person exceeds the projected emissions of 2.7 billion individuals
in 2030 (one-third of the world population). The 1 tCO2/yr floor
is roughly consistent with Millennium Development Goals
(http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). Establishing such a floor
has the consequence of shielding the lowest one-third of the
world’s emitters from the CO2 reduction strategies that will need
to permeate the activities of the other two-thirds of the world’s
population to achieve significant global CO2 emission reductions
(9). The world’s lowest emitters would not be thwarted from
obtaining diesel engines to produce their first electricity for
lighting, television, and the charging of batteries; gasoline fuel
for their first motorized transport; and liquid petroleum gas for
their first modern cooking fuel—where these technologies are
the lowest-cost options.
The consequences of a 1 tCO2 floor for the mitigation
required of the other two-thirds of the world’s population are
small, as Fig. 6 shows. See the cap, labeled ‘‘30P,’’ that results
when a floor of 1 tCO2 in 2030 is in place and the 2030 global
emission target of 30 GtCO2 is retained. To compensate for the
additional 1.5 GtCO2 of reductions by high emitters required to
create such a floor, the universal cap is 9.6 tCO2 (down from 10.8
tCO2) and the number of ‘‘high emitters’’ is 1.30 billion (up from
1.13 billion). The message of Fig. 6 is that addressing climate
change mitigation and meeting the basic energy needs of the
global poor are nearly decoupled objectives.
According to the EIA (7), each ton of fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in 2003 was associated with
$2000 of global GDP. Accordingly, EIA projects a CO2 intensity of the global economy
(emissions/GDP) that decreases by 43%between 2003 and 2030 in their BAU scenario. This
corresponds to a 2.1% reduction per year—faster than the 1.8% per year reduction
observed during the 1990–2003 period. Targets for emissions reductions necessitate still
faster reductions, achieved by carbon intensity reductions beyond those embedded in
BAU. For example, achieving a 30 GtCO2/yr target in 2030 produces a global economy
where each ton of fossil-fuel CO2 is associated with $5100 of global GDP, i.e., a 3.4%
reduction per year in global carbon intensity.
Fig. 3. Cartoon version of the capping scheme for generating national
allocations.
Table 1. Regional reference emissions, population, emission allocation, and number of people affected for 2030 under a global target
at 30 GtCO2, with (P) and without the poverty provision
Region
Emis.
[1990],
GtCO2
Emis.
[2003],
GtCO2
Pop.
[2003],
millions
Emis.
(BAU)
[2030],
GtCO2
Pop.
(BAU)
[2030],
millions
Emis.
(30)
[2030],
GtCO2
Pop.
under
cap
(30)
[2030],
millions
Emis.
(30P)
[2030],
GtCO2
Pop.
under
cap
(30P)
[2030],
millions
(30P)
change
w.r.t
[1990],
%
(30P)
change
w.r.t
[2003],
%
(30P)
change
w.r.t
(BAU),
%
U.S. 5.0 5.8 291 8.0 365 3.6 267 3.2 285 35 45 60
Canada 0.5 0.6 32 0.7 39 0.4 29 0.3 31 27 40 53
Mexico 0.3 0.4 101 0.7 129 0.6 14 0.5 16 81 43 21
OECD Europe 4.1 4.3 529 4.7 561 3.8 139 3.6 175 11 16 23
Japan 1.0 1.2 128 1.3 123 1.1 43 1.0 57 1 18 22
South Korea 0.2 0.5 48 0.7 50 0.5 30 0.4 34 81 9 37
Australia and
New Zealand
0.3 0.4 24 0.6 30 0.3 21 0.3 22 11 37 55
OECD minus U.S. 6.4 7.4 861 8.7 931 6.6 276 6.2 336 3 16 28
Total OECD 11.4 13.3 1152 16.7 1296 10.2 543 9.5 620 17 29 43
China 2.2 4.0 1296 11.4 1442 8.5 300 8.2 354 264 106 29
Russia 2.3 1.6 145 2.2 125 1.2 77 1.1 85 54 33 51
Transition
Economies
1.9 1.1 195 1.6 190 1.3 49 1.2 60 34 12 26
India 0.6 1.1 1065 2.2 1442 2.2 1 2.3 2 304 121 7
Other Non-OECD
Asia
0.8 1.4 927 2.8 1308 2.2 47 2.5 52 213 85 9
Middle East 0.7 1.2 175 2.3 282 1.4 56 1.4 64 97 13 41
Africa 0.6 1.0 854 1.8 1438 1.4 23 2.2 27 244 128 24
Brazil 0.2 0.3 181 0.6 237 0.6 10 0.6 13 161 80 4
Other South and
Central America
0.5 0.6 257 1.2 349 1.0 22 1.0 27 126 59 16
Non-OECD minus
China
7.6 8.3 3798 14.8 5370 11.3 284 12.4 330 63 50 16
Total Non-OECD 9.8 12.2 5094 26.2 6812 19.8 583 20.5 684 109 68 22
Total World 21.2 25.5 6245 42.9 8108 30.0 1126 30.0 1304 41 18 30
Data from the 4 italicized lines are plotted in Figs. 4 and 5.
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In Table 1, the ninth and tenth columns show the national/
regional emission allocations when the 2030 target is modified to
include this 1 tCO2 emission floor. The U.S. target falls by 0.34
GtCO2 (10%) and the African target rises by 0.8 GtCO2 (54%).
Summary of Results. Fig. 7 provides a summary of the national
mitigation effort for 7 major regions in 2030. The bars show that
the U.S. and China have the 2 highest CO2 abatement assign-
ments. India mostly gets a free pass, but not Africa, due to high
carbon intensity and inequality in South Africa and in North
African nations with energy industries. Russia and the Middle
East get sizeable mitigation assignments for the same reasons.
The 5 GtCO2 increments from the weakest to the most
stringent global policy are taken up differently by different
regions. The mild global target of 35 GtCO2 affects the U.S.
more than the other regions; the U.S. has 185 million of the
world’s 600 million people whose emissions exceed the relatively
high (16.8 tCO2/year) individual cap of this policy. The addi-
tional emission cuts to comply with more stringent global targets
decline for the U.S. but remain constant for China and Europe,
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Fig. 4. Regional emission distributions in 2030, revealing the number of
individuals above the cap of 10.8 tCO2/yr (corresponding to a global target of
30 GtCO2 in 2030). The regional efforts are comparable: The U.S. has 270
million people who, relative to ‘‘Business As Usual’’ for 2030, in aggregate
reduce emissions by 4.4 GtCO2; the OECD minus U.S. has 280 million who
reduce 2.1 GtCO2; China has 300 million who reduce 2.9 GtCO2; and the
non-OECD minus China has 280 million who reduce 3.5 GtCO2.
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Fig. 5. Regional targets (solid lines) for a global emission trajectory that
allows global emissions to peak at 33 GtCO2 in 2020 and to arrive at 30 GtCO2
in 2030. Dashed lines show the regional BAU emissions.
Fig. 6. Individual emissions in 2030 when global emissions are 30 GtCO2 and
a poverty provision is included that puts a floor on individual emissions at 1
tCO2, raising the emissions of 2.7 billion people who emit less than 1 tCO2
(green area at the right). The red strip at the left between the ‘‘30’’ and ‘‘30P’’
arrows shows the extra reduction required of the high emitters to provide the
headroom to achieve this floor. Relative to the same climate goal without a
poverty provision (‘‘30’’), the cap that includes this poverty alleviation objec-
tive (‘‘30P’’) is lowered from 10.8 to 9.6 tCO2, and 1.30 instead of 1.13 billion
people are under the cap.
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Fig. 7. Emissions in 7 of the 16 EIA regions, in 1990, 2003, and for the global
mitigation policies of 35, 30, 25, and 20 GtCO2 in 2030, bothwith andwithout
poverty provision. The last bar on the right for each region indicates the
targets corresponding to an equal per capita allocation scheme and the same
4 global mitigation targets. A table with data for all of the 16 regions can be
found in the SI Appendix.
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reflecting the progressive involvement of all regions as the
individual emission cap tightens.
Fig. 7 shows that allowing for the poverty provision of 1 tCO2
changes most national targets very little. An exception is Africa,
which, as a result of its large carbon-poor population, now gets
significantly higher allocations.
The regional targets resulting from our poverty floor can be
compared to the ones resulting from an equal-per capita (EPC)
allocation scheme, where the 30 GtCO2 global emission target
for 2030 is divided equally among the world’s expected 8.1 billion
people, resulting in a universal individual allowance of 3.7 tCO2.
(In the language of our proposal, the EPC allocation scheme
lowers the individual emission cap and raises the poverty floor
to the same value, here, for 2030, 3.7 tCO2/person.) Fig. 7 shows
that all regions receive a more stringent target in the EPC
scheme, with the exception of India and Africa, whose emission
targets are significantly larger and roughly equal—due to their
similar 2030 populations.
Discussion and Conclusions
The approach presented in this paper is motivated by the reality
that emissions fromOECD countries and from countries outside
the OECD are now roughly equal, and therefore tough global
atmospheric stabilization targets require the participation of the
developing countries. In our interpretation of fairness, individ-
uals who emit similar amounts of CO2, regardless of where they
live, are expected to contribute to fossil-fuel CO2 emission
reductions in similar ways. In principle, no country gets a pass,
because even in the poorest countries some individuals have CO2
emissions above the universal emission cap.
A well-designed national policy would contain costs and not
exacerbate inequalities. Many of the lowest-cost opportunities
for CO2 emission reduction over the next few decades in all
countries, especially in the developing countries, will be found in
the middle of the emission distribution, associated with billions
of people of modest means. Many of them will be moving into
cities for the first time and, in a CO2-responsive economy, would
be housed in well-built apartment buildings equipped with
efficient appliances and served by efficient mass transit systems.
Thus, pursuing CO2 emission reduction across a wide swath of
a country’s economy is likely to be preferable to capping the
emissions of the high emitters only, as could be inferred from a
literal interpretation of the horizontal cutoff in Fig. 2.
Of the countless directions for further work, we note here only
a few. It is important to develop more refined tools that reveal
the high emitters in developing countries now hidden in the tails
of the distributions—for example, in India. Direct measurement
of the individual emission distribution using specially designed
household surveys may achieve this objective. A better under-
standing of changes in distributions over time, including the
connection between the shape and growth of the emission
distribution and the rate (and acceleration) of economic growth,
would improve BAU emission projections. The detailed conse-
quences of our scheme for international trading of emission
allocations should be investigated and compared with EPC and
other schemes.
To review, our scheme requires only a globally agreed emis-
sion target and consensus regarding national BAU emissions.**
Nations derive their obligations from the emissions of their
high-emitting citizens, but are left free to decide on implemen-
tation policies at national and international levels. It easily
accommodates periodic updating as projections of national
emissions are revised and improved information about income
and emission distributions is obtained. Our scheme does not take
into account emissions from land use and non-CO2 greenhouse
gases, emissions embedded in the trade of goods and services,††
differences in regional climate and country size, inertia restrict-
ing rates of change, and prior ‘‘legacy’’ emissions.‡‡
Our scheme can be viewed as a step toward allocation on the
basis of equal per capita emission rights, but we do not get there
in one step. We take into account high emitters above a global
cap and low emitters below a global f loor, but there is a gap
between the cap and the floor. Further application of the
underlying principles proposed here would bring about succes-
sive reductions of the high-emitter cap and increases of the
emission floor, until eventually they converge.
Perhaps our allocation framework can enrich the search for
fair and uniform allocation rules governing the international
post-2012 regime for climate change mitigation.
**Substantial revisions of emission projections are now underway to take into account the
current global recession, see for example http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/.
††See for example refs. 10 and 11 for estimates of the emissions embodied in international
trade of goods.
‡‡Usually, legacy emissions refer to past emissions of nations. In a scheme like ours, which
is basedon theemissionsof individuals, legacymightbe incorporatedby redefining ‘‘high
emitters’’ as those individuals with high lifetime emissions prior to a specific year.
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